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Abstract—Aerial drones are becoming an integral part of appli-
cation domains including but not limited to, military operations,
package delivery, construction, monitoring and search/rescue
operations. It is critical to ensure the cyber security of net-
worked aerial drone systems in these applications. Standard
cryptographic services can be deployed to provide basic security
services; however, they have been shown to be inefficient in terms
of energy and time consumption, especially for small aerial drones
with resource-limited processors. Therefore, there is a significant
need for an efficient cryptographic framework that can meet the
requirements of small aerial drones.
We propose an improved cryptographic framework for small
aerial drones, which offers significant energy efficiency and speed
advantages over standard cryptographic techniques. (i) We create
(to the best of our knowledge) the first optimized public key
infrastructure (PKI) based framework for small aerial drones,
which provides energy efficient techniques by harnessing special
precomputation methods and optimized elliptic curves. (ii) We
also integrate recent light-weight symmetric primitives into
our PKI techniques to provide a full-fledged cryptographic
framework. (iii) We implemented standard counterparts and our
proposed techniques on an actual small aerial drone (Crazyflie
2.0), and provided an in-depth energy analysis. Our experiments
showed that our improved cryptographic framework achieves up
to 35× lower energy consumption than its standard counterpart.
I. INTRODUCTION
Aerial drones are emerging mobile cyber-physical sys-
tems with potential applications such as military operations,
package delivery, reconnaissance, environmental monitoring
and disaster recovery/response [1], [2], [3], [4]. Due to the
significant financial and strategic value involved, aerial drones
are expected to be exclusively targeted by attackers. These
attacks are especially critical for military networks where some
sensitive information can be extracted. For instance, in 4th
December 2011, a US drone (RQ-170 Sentinel) was captured
by Iranian forces. A strong theory that explains how it was
captured supposes that the navigation system of the drone was
attacked [4], [5]. Another incident is the keylogging attack that
targeted a US drone fleet in September 2011 [4]. This attack
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can cause the exposure of the control station and potentially
result in the full control on the drone.
Therefore, it is critical to ensure the cyber security of aerial
drone systems. In particular, the basic security services such as
confidentiality, authentication, and integrity must be provided
to refrain from mentioned attacks. These services are mainly
guaranteed via fundamental cryptographic techniques such
as symmetric ciphers and PKI. Symmetric key cryptography
is highly preferred due to its efficiency and well-analyzed
security. However, public key primitives can also be highly
useful for certain drone applications. For instance, public key
cryptography offers scalability, public verifiability, and non-
repudiation that are critical for large and distributed drone
networks (e.g., military operations, search and rescue).
Energy and bandwidth constraints pose critical limitations
towards the deployment of standard cryptographic techniques
on small aerial drones [6]. In the following, we outline recent
cryptographic techniques that are considered for aerial drones
and highlight some obstacles against practical deployments.
A. Related Work
Security Vulnerabilities and Solutions: Son et al. [7] pointed
out that most of commodity (civilian) drone telemetry sys-
tems do not provide a cryptographic protection to secure the
communication. Thus, they proposed a fingerprinting method
that would potentially provide some authentication for drones
in motion. Some security vulnerabilities of current drone
configurations were shown in [8], [9]. That is, it might be
possible to extract frequency hopping sequence of FHSS-type
drone controllers using a software defined radio [8]. Moreover,
it is possible make a drone crash by exploiting the resonance
frequency of MEMS gyroscopes [9]. Birnbach et al. [10]
identified the privacy invasion attacks performed by drones
and offered detection mechanisms.
Cryptographic Techniques: Initial approaches to secure the
aerial drones include implementation of well-known protocols
(e.g., RSA and AES) on FPGAs [11], [12]. However, they
showed that standard techniques take a lot of computation time
and consume high amount of energy on small aerial drones that
are further confirmed by our experiments (see Section V).
Seo et al. [13] proposed a security framework that imple-
mented some symmetric ciphers with white-box cryptography
to mitigate the impacts of drone capture attacks [13]. However,
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Fig. 1: The performance comparison of the proposed and standard cryptographic frameworks.
the insecurity of this line of research has been later shown
in [14]. Won et al. proposed Certificateless Signcryption based
protocols for mid-size aerial drones (e.g., AR.Drone 2.0)
in [15]. This protocol reduces the communication overhead
by eliminating certificates, but requires several exponentiations
and therefore introduces heavy overhead, which might not be
practical for resource-limited small aerial drones. Moreover,
aerial drones are expected to be an integral part of Internet
of Things (IoT), which vastly relies on PKI technology.
Certificateless protocols cannot be seamlessly integrated into
existing PKI-based IoT systems without significant alterations.
Precomputations and optimizations of public key cryptogra-
phy algorithms were considered on power constrained nodes.
These include sole implementations of certain primitives (e.g.,
digital signature [16]) and improvements on a few asymmetric
primitives (e.g., [17]). However, these techniques do not harbor
the optimized elliptic curves (e.g., FourQ [18]) with the pre-
computation techniques to offer a comprehensive framework.
One may observe that the following issues should be
addressed towards a practical deployment of cryptographic
techniques on small aerial drones (i) The existing standard
primitives and cryptographic protocols are inefficient in terms
of energy/time consumption for small aerial drones that op-
erates with resource-limited microprocessors (see Figure 1).
(ii) The existing cryptographic protocols for aerial drones
only focus on a few specific primitives but do not offer
a comprehensive framework that harbors a variety of light-
weight symmetric and asymmetric primitives. (iii) To the best
of our knowledge, there is no open-source framework, even
for some standard cryptographic primitives, which offers a
detailed energy assessment.
B. Our Contribution
Towards the practical adoption of cryptographic techniques
to resource-limited small aerial drones, we propose an im-
proved cryptographic framework by harnessing various cryp-
tographic primitives and optimizations, which provides signif-
icantly lower delay and energy consumption for small aerial
drones, compared to the deployment of standard cryptographic
techniques. We further outline our contributions as follows:
• An Efficient Framework with Algorithmic Improvements:
Our goal is to reduce the overhead of cryptographic primitives
to minimize their energy consumption for small aerial drones.
Therefore, we exploit synergies among special precomputation
techniques and elliptic curves (EC), which not only offer the
most compact key/signature sizes among available alternatives,
but also significantly reduce the computational cost of EC
scalar multiplication.
We develop (to the best of our knowledge) the first real-
ization of Boyko-Peinado-Venkatesan (BPV) precomputation
technique [19] on FourQ curve [18]. BPV technique reduces
the cost of an EC scalar multiplication to only a few EC addi-
tions with only a small constant-size storage overhead. Remark
that FourQ curve is one of the most addition friendly curves
(even with a better efficiency than that of Curve25519 [20]),
and therefore our integration further enhances the efficiency
of BPV. We then instantiate BPV-FourQ-Schnorr and BPV-
FourQ-ECIES as our improved digital signature and integrated
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encryption schemes, which significantly outperform their stan-
dard counterparts. Moreover, we also integrate some of the
recent light-weight symmetric primitives into our improved
PKI suite to create a full-fledged cryptographic framework.
• In-depth Energy Analysis: The energy consumption of
standard Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) based primitives
have not been investigated thoroughly for recently emerging
small aerial drones. In this paper, we implemented both stan-
dard ECC techniques and our proposed cryptographic frame-
work and presented a detailed energy consumption analysis.
As demonstrated in Figure 1, for different cryptographic prim-
itives, our experiments showed that proposed improvements
enable up to 35× less energy consumption compared to the
standard techniques for small aerial drones (see Section V).
Similar performance gains were observed for the light-weight
ciphers over the standard symmetric primitives.
• Open-Source Framework: While isolated implementation
results were reported for particular cryptographic primitives
such as RSA and AES [11], [12], to the best of our knowledge,
no comprehensive open-source cryptographic framework is
available for small aerial drones. Towards meeting this need,
we implemented our standard and improved cryptographic
frameworks. We open-source both to enable a broad test and
potential adoption at
https://github.com/ozgurozmen/Dronecrypt
Limitations: The main limitation of our proposed framework
is the increased private key size, that is inherited from the BPV
precomputation technique. More specifically, our improved
PKI primitives require the sender to store a private key of 64
KB. However, this increased private key size translates into
significant improvements on computational time and energy
consumption. Moreover, only a small portion of this key (1
KB) must be loaded into RAM for computations. Considering
the storage capabilities of small aerial drones, we believe this
is a desirable trade-off for security-critical applications. On the
other hand, if the drone is highly memory-limited and cannot
tolerate such storage, standard cryptographic primitives should
be preferred.
II. PRELIMINARIES
TABLE I: Notation followed to describe schemes.
Fq Finite Field
G Generator Group Point
n Order of Group
〈y,Y〉 Private/Public key pair
Γ BPV Precomputation Table
m Message
Ek IND-CPA Encryption via key k
Dk IND-CPA Decryption via key k
× Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication (Emul)
KDF Key Derivation Function
Elliptic Curve (EC) points are shown in bold
BPV Pre-computation Technique: We use BPV genera-
tor [19], which reduces the computational cost of an Emul to
a few EC additions with the expense of a table storage. The
BPV generator is a tuple of two algorithms (Offline,Online)
defined in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Boyko-Peinado-Venkatesan (BPV) Generator
(Γ, v, k, Fq,G, n)← BPV .Offline(1κ):
1: Set the EC system-wide parameters params ←
(Fq,G, n).
2: Generate BPV parameters (v, k), where k and v are the
number of pairs to be pre-computed and the number of
elements to be randomly selected out k pairs, respectively,
for 2 < v < k.
3: r′i
$← Z∗n, R′i ← r′i ×G, i = 0, . . . , k − 1.
4: Set pre-computation table Γ = {r′i,R′i}k−1i=0 .
(r,R)← BPV .Online(Γ, v, k, Fq,G, n):
1: Generate a random set S ⊂ [0, k − 1], where |S| = v.
2: r ← ∑i∈S r′i mod n, R← ∑i∈SR′i.
FourQ Curve: FourQ is a high-security, high-performance
elliptic curve [18]. FourQ synergizes some well-known EC
optimizations to offer high-speed EC scalar multiplication and
EC addition while preserving 128-bit security.
Standard Techniques: Our standard cryptographic frame-
work consists of broadly standardized techniques.
We select secp256k1 curve to implement our standard
public key cryptography services, such as ECDH [21],
ECDSA [22], and ECIES [23]. Secp256k1 is a NIST rec-
ommended curve [24], which is frequently used in practice.
We implemented a key exchange, a digital signature and an
integrated scheme to secure a variety of applications. We
also implemented some of the most well-known symmetric
key cryptography techniques such as AES as the block ci-
pher [25], AES-GCM as the authenticated encryption [26]
and HMAC with SHA-256 for MAC. Note that, an open-
source implementation and in-depth energy analysis of such
standard cryptographic framework for small aerial drones are
not currently available (to the best of our knowledge).
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
A. Low Cost PKC Primitives
One may consider adopting traditional pre-computation
methods to reduce the computation overhead of crypto-
graphic techniques. However, traditional online/offline pre-
computation methods require linear storage. Thus, they may
not be feasible for small aerial drones equipped with light-
weight microcontrollers. In addition, once the pre-computed
tokens are depleted, they must be regenerated. It is shown that
the regeneration cost of these pre-computation techniques may
incur even more cost than following the original protocol [27].
We propose an integrated approach that only requires small-
constant storage overhead and highly optimized EC addition
operations as opposed to a full EC scalar multiplication. To
achieve this objective, we present an instantiation of BPV on
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FourQ curve, which is ideal for BPV due to its very fast EC ad-
ditions. With BPV, we reduce EC scalar multiplication opera-
tions of our target schemes/protocols to only a few EC addition
operations. The integration of FourQ into BPV amplifies the
performance gain as it is an addition efficient curve. As it will
be showcased in Section V, this strategy enables almost 35×
more efficient operations compared to the standard schemes
(with standard curves such as secp256k1). The storage cost of
such an energy efficiency gain is only a constant-size storage
of 64KB (for parameters v = 16, k = 1024, see Section II)
keying material. With the current capabilities of low-end
processors, even on the small aerial drones (such as Crazyflie
2.0 [6]), it is feasible to store such a private key. We then use
BPV-FourQ to instantiate three main cryptographic schemes,
which creates the following efficient digital signature, key
exchange, and integrated encryption suite:
(i) We integrate our optimized BPV-FourQ into Schnorr
signature scheme to gain computational efficiency. This trans-
formation is presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 BPV-FourQ-Schnorr Signature
(Γ, y,Y)← BPV -FourQ-Schnorr .Kg(1κ):
1: Generate parameters and BPV table as
(Γ, v, k, Fq,G, n)← BPV .Offline(1κ).
2: Generate private/public key pair (y $← Z∗n,Y ← y ×G)
(s, e)← BPV -FourQ-Schnorr .Sig(m, y,Γ):
1: (r,R)← BPV .Online(Γ, v, k, Fq,G, n)
2: e← H(m||R), s← (r− e · y) mod n where H is a full
domain cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗n.
b← BPV -FourQ-Schnorr .Ver(m, 〈s, e〉,Y):
1: R′ ← e×Y + s×G
2: If e = H(m||R′) then set b = 1 as valid, else b = 0 .
(ii) Similarly, we instantiate ECDH with BPV-FourQ. In
the ECDH variant, each node first derives its private/public
key pair with an EC scalar multiplication, and then one more
EC scalar multiplication is performed in order to obtain the
shared key [21]. We adopt BPV protocol so that each node
derives its private/public key pair with only EC additions.
This decreases the computation time and energy consumption
of the protocol by almost 1.5×, in the expense of storing a
64KB table. Moreover, it is almost 28× more efficient than its
standard counterpart (ECDH on secp256k1, see Section V).
(iii) In ECIES protocol, node 1 first derives the shared secret
by generating an ephemeral private/public key pair and then
computing the shared secret using node 2’s public key [23].
Then, she generates encryption and MAC keys from this
shared secret with a pre-determined key derivation function.
We adopt BPV to ECIES by transforming the first EC scalar
multiplication (where the ephemeral private/public key pair is
generated) to EC additions, as depicted in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 BPV-FourQ-ECIES Encryption
(Γ, y,Y)← BPV -FourQ-ECIES .Kg(1κ):
1: Generate parameters and BPV table as
(Γ, v, k, Fq,G, n)← BPV .Offline(1κ).
2: Generate private/public key pair (y $← Z∗n,Y ← y ×G)
(c, d,R)← BPV -FourQ-ECIES .Enc(m,Y,Γ):
1: (r,R)← BPV .Online(Γ, v, k, Fq,G, n)
2: Generate shared secret as T← r ×Y
3: (kenc, kMAC)← KDF (T)
4: c← Ekenc(m)
5: d←MACkMAC (c)
m← BPV -FourQ-ECIES .Dec(y, 〈c, d,R〉):
1: T′ ← y ×R mod p
2: (kenc, kMAC)← KDF (T′)
3: If d 6= MACkMAC (c) return INVALID
4: m← Dkenc(c)
B. Low Cost Symmetric Key Primitives
We integrate light-weight ciphers and symmetric authenti-
cation mechanisms into our framework. Specifically, we use
CHACHA20 as a very fast stream cipher [28], CHACHA-
POLY as the authenticated encryption and POLY1305 as the
MAC protocol [29]. These schemes provide faster and energy-
efficient encryption/authentication while still offering high-
security guarantees [30]. Our experiments confirmed that the
adoption of these light-weight ciphers offer significant im-
provements in terms of computation time and energy consump-
tion. For instance, these light-weight symmetric techniques
enable up-to 7× improvement over standard symmetric ciphers
(e.g., AES) for small aerial drones (see Section V).
IV. SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The security of our improved PKC suite relies on the
security of the optimization techniques (BPV precomputation
technique and FourQ curve), since the underlying schemes
(Schnorr, ECDH and ECIES) are all well-studied and stan-
dardized. BPV technique takes advantage of the random walks
on Cayley graphs over Abelian groups and it relies on the
hardness of hidden subset sum problem. Boyko et al, show
that any attack to BPV technique would require solving non-
linear lattice problems [19]. BPV technique in elliptic curve
based schemes (as adopted in our proposed framework) were
later investigated in [16], with an integration to ECDSA. This
integration relies on the affine hidden subset sum problem.
Since the BPV technique is used in our schemes without
any modification, it inherits its security guarantees presented
in [19], [16]. As discussed in Section II, FourQ is a special
elliptic curve that combines multiple optimizations to enable
fast operations. While offering high computational efficiency,
FourQ still preserves 128-bit security level that is the same
with standardized secp256k1 curve [18].
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The security of the light-weight ciphers and symmetric
authentication mechanisms are studied in [30]. Their security
is equivalent to their well-known standard counterparts such
as AES. Moreover, we used CHACHA20, that is the 20
round CHACHA scheme to ensure its security [30]. Therefore,
the security of our proposed framework is well-analyzed and
comparable to the standard framework.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup and Evaluation Metrics
We worked on Crazyflie 2.0 (Figure 2) due to its open-
source software and hardware [6]. Crazyflie 2.0 has two mi-
crocontrollers: (i) An STM32F405 microcontroller as the main
controller that runs all the flight control codes. Both crypto-
graphic frameworks were implemented on this microcontroller
due to its capabilities. (ii) An ultra light-weight nRF51822
microcontroller is responsible for the communication (radio)
and power management.
Fig. 2: Crazyflie 2.0
STM32F405 is equipped
with an ARM Cortex M-4
architecture and operates
at 168 MHz. It is a 32-
bit microcontroller with a
192 KB SRAM and 1 MB
flash memory. Although
STM32F405 is a resourceful
processor, it has very low
power consumption. It operates
at 3.3V and takes 40mA of
current while operating at 168
MHz. Our evaluation metrics include computation time,
storage, communication bandwidth, and energy consumption.
We measured the energy consumption with the formula
E = V · I · t, where V = 3.3V , I = 40mA [31] and t is the
computation time based on the clock cycles. Moreover, we
connected an ammeter between the device and the battery to
double check the current taken by the processor and observed
insignificant difference with 40mA, while running at 168
MHz.
We used the following libraries in our implementa-
tions. (i) All symmetric primitives are implemented using
WolfCrypt [32]. (ii) We implemented all standard public key
services using microECC [33] as it is a light-weight and open-
source library. (iii) All optimized public key primitives are
implemented with open-source Microsoft FourQ library [18].
We selected BPV parameters as v = 16 and k = 1024, which
sets the size of Γ as 64 KB, that can be easily stored in
STM32F405. We note that all libraries used for both standard
and optimized frameworks are open-source, therefore they can
be easily integrated to various aerial drones.
B. Performance Evaluation and Comparison
Experimental comparison of the standard framework and
our proposed framework are presented in Tables II and III, for
public key and symmetric cryptography, respectively.
Although energy consumption is critical for small aerial
drones, computation time also has some crucial effects on the
adoption of cryptographic protocols in practice. For instance,
there are time-critical applications that need frequent data
transmission (e.g. camera mounted on an aerial drone for
video surveillance - 24 frames per second are necessary).
Cryptographic primitives used to secure such applications
should meet this demand by offering high-speed operations.
Therefore, we believe CPU Time improvements depicted in
Tables II and III are also critical for small aerial drones.
Below, we present the comparison between the standard
framework and our proposed framework, with an application
to use-cases for small aerial drones.
• Digital Signature and Broadcast Authentication: Digital
signatures are commonly used for broadcast authentication
and key certification purposes. Drones may be used in sce-
narios where the drone needs to broadcast its sensor data,
such as GPS data for location, photo frames for monitoring
and temperature/pressure data for meteorological observation.
Since digital signatures offer scalability, public verifiability,
and non-repudiation properties that are lacked by symmetric
key authentication mechanisms, they should be preferred for
broadcast authentication. Moreover, certificates are necessary
to protect key exchange schemes from man-in-the-middle
attacks. Digital signatures are extensively used in practice
for certification. Therefore, whenever a drone makes a key
exchange with a server or another drone, certificate verification
(digital signature verification) must be performed.
Our proposed framework offers significant improvements
over the standard framework. As depicted in Figure 1, energy
consumption of digital signature is decreased to 0.21mJ from
7.40mJ with a 35.24× improvement. Moreover, the maximum
signing throughput of the standard framework is 17 messages
per second, that may not be sufficient for real-time use-cases.
• Integrated Public Key Encryption and Key Exchange:
Although public key encryption is costly compared to sym-
metric key encryption, there are various use-cases that it
can be useful. One of such cases could be when multiple
drones need to report to a single server. We believe public
key encryption can be useful for applications such as military
drone fleets, tracking and search/rescue operations, due to the
scalability concerns of symmetric key primitives. Moreover,
ECIES provides forward security, which is useful for security-
critical applications such as military operations.
A key exchange protocol is essential for aerial drone net-
works for the management and distribution of symmetric keys.
That is, it might not be always possible to assume pre-installed
symmetric keys for all drones as the controller/server may
change for different purposes/use-cases. Therefore, an efficient
key exchange protocol is useful to be deployed on drones.
Our optimized framework with algorithmic improvements
achieves significantly lower energy consumption and faster
encryption/key exchange than that of the standard framework.
BPV-FourQ-ECIES is 27.70× more energy efficient than stan-
dard ECIES protocol. BPV-FourQ-ECDH also improved its
standard counterpart by 27.68×. Besides the energy efficiency,
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TABLE II: Comparison of Standard and Optimized Public Key Cryptographic Frameworks
Protocol CPU Cycles CPU Time (ms) Memory¶ (Byte) Bandwidth (Byte) Energy Consumption (mJ)
Standard Cryptographic Framework
ECDH 17611413 104.83 32 32 13.84
ECDSA-Sign 9411839 56.02 32 64 7.40
ECDSA-Verify 8169117 48.62 32 64 6.42
ECIES-Encrypt 17625012 104.91 32 32 + |c| + |MAC| 13.85
ECIES-Decrypt 8817657 52.49 32 32 + |c| + |MAC| 6.93
Optimized Cryptographic Framework with Algorithmic Improvements
BPV ECDH on FourQ 636833 3.79 65536 32 0.50
BPV Schnorr-Sign on FourQ 264011 1.57 65536 64 0.21
BPV Schnorr-Verify on FourQ 683882 4.07 32 64 0.54
BPV ECIES-Encrypt on FourQ 638791 3.80 65536 32 + |c| + |MAC| 0.50
BPV ECIES-Decrypt on FourQ 513487 3.06 32 32 + |c| + |MAC| 0.40
¶ Memory denotes the private key size for sign/encrypt schemes and the public key size for verify/decrypt schemes. We want to note that even though the total memory
required for BPV schemes is 64 KB (that includes t = 1024 components), only 1 KB (v = 16) of it is loaded into RAM for a single operation.
TABLE III: Comparison of Standard and Optimized Symmetric Cryptographic Frameworks
Protocol (MB/s) CPU Cycles¶ CPU Time (µs) Energy Consumption (µJ)
Standard Cryptographic Framework
AES 0.926 5537 32.96 4.35
AES-GCM 0.377 13599 80.95 10.68
HMAC† 3.338 1536 9.14 1.21
Optimized Cryptographic Framework
CHACHA20 3.554 1443 8.59 1.13
CHACHA-POLY 2.619 1958 11.65 1.54
POLY1305 13.709 374 2.23 0.29
¶ CPU cycles presented here are for a 32-byte message.
† SHA256 is used as the standard hash function for HMAC.
our optimized protocols offer fast computation that is impor-
tant for time-critical applications.
• Light-weight Symmetric Primitives: Symmetric key cryp-
tography can be used for various use-cases on drones, due
to their low energy consumption. For instance, securing the
command and control channel is the minimum requirement for
a safe operation of any aerial drone system. This channel can
be easily secured via symmetric key primitives. We suggest
using an authenticated symmetric encryption to secure this
communication channel. Moreover, when a single aerial drone
reports its sensor data to one or a few base stations, symmetric
key primitives can be preferred over public key schemes.
Although the energy consumption of symmetric primitives
is minimal compared to PKC, it is still useful to optimize
their energy consumption as their use with high message
throughputs might be much higher. For example, 100 messages
per second are necessary to have a stable flight, which means
100 encryption/authentication operations per second [6]. When
authenticated encryption schemes are used to secure this
channel as suggested, our proposed framework offers 6.95×
lower energy consumption. Our proposed framework still
achieves 3.84× and 4.11× lower energy consumption for
sole encryption and authentication, respectively. Therefore, our
proposed framework offers significant energy improvement
over its standard counterpart for symmetric key primitives.
Discussions: We would like to note that our experiments
were performed on the drone processor while flight control
codes were inactive. When these codes are active, it would
potentially increase the run-time of both frameworks. Since
the impact of such a slow-down would be similar, we believe
the improvements of our framework will remain. More impor-
tantly, the message throughput that both framework can sup-
port will decrease. Considering that the standard framework
is already struggling meeting with the requirements of time-
critical use-cases with current configurations, it will suffer
more from this decrease in throughput. Therefore, we believe
that, in a real-life deployment, the benefits of our improved
framework would even increase and our framework can meet
the needs of stringent requirements of real-time applications.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, to the best our knowledge, we proposed the
first open-source low energy cryptographic framework tailored
for small aerial drones with an in-depth energy consumption
analysis. Our framework integrates algorithmic optimizations
to improve the performance of standard PKC techniques,
all supported with light-weight symmetric ciphers. We
have implemented and deployed our optimized framework on
Crazyflie 2.0, and compared its performance with the standard
techniques. Our experiments confirmed that our improved
framework offers up-to 35× higher speed and better energy
efficiency compared with its standard counterpart. Therefore,
our improved framework can meet some of the stringent
energy and delay requirements of aerial drone networks with
only a small impact on the battery life and end-to-end delay.
We open-source our cryptographic framework for public
testing, improvement and adoption purposes.
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